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Abstract—This paper presents how to leak private information
from a wireless signal classifier by launching an over-the-air
membership inference attack (MIA). As machine learning (ML)
algorithms are used to process wireless signals to make decisions
such as PHY-layer authentication, the training data character-
istics (e.g., device-level information) and the environment condi-
tions (e.g., channel information) under which the data is collected
may leak to the ML model. As a privacy threat, the adversary
can use this leaked information to exploit vulnerabilities of the
ML model following an adversarial ML approach. In this paper,
the MIA is launched against a deep learning-based classifier that
uses waveform, device, and channel characteristics (power and
phase shifts) in the received signals for RF fingerprinting. By
observing the spectrum, the adversary builds first a surrogate
classifier and then an inference model to determine whether
a signal of interest has been used in the training data of the
receiver (e.g., a service provider). The signal of interest can then
be associated with particular device and channel characteristics
to launch subsequent attacks. The probability of attack success
is high (more than 88% depending on waveform and channel
conditions) in identifying signals of interest (and potentially the
device and channel information) used to build a target classifier.
These results show that wireless signal classifiers are vulnerable
to privacy threats due to the over-the-air information leakage of
their ML models.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, deep learning,
membership inference attack, wireless signal classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks need to perform complex tasks in the
dynamic spectrum environment subject to various channel,
interference, and traffic effects. Machine learning (ML) has
emerged with powerful means to learn from and adapt to
spectrum dynamics. Supported by recent advances in optimiza-
tion algorithms and computing platforms, deep learning (DL)
can effectively capture characteristics of high-dimensional
spectrum data and support various wireless communication
tasks, including but not limited to, spectrum sensing, spectrum
allocation, signal classification, and waveform design [1].
Despite its demonstrated success in wireless applications, ML
also raises unique challenges in terms of security [2]–[4]. In
particular, with adversarial ML [5], recent work has demon-
strated that various attacks can be effectively launched against
DL-based wireless systems, including inference (exploratory)
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attack [6], [7], evasion (adversarial) attack [8]–[15], poisoning
(causative) attack [15]–[17], Trojan attack [18], spoofing attack
[19], and covert communications [20]. Due to their small
footprints, the attacks built upon adversarial ML are stealthier
and harder to detect compared with conventional wireless
attacks such as jamming [21], [22].
?
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Fig. 1. The membership inference attack (MIA).
In addition to security threats, another concern regarding
safe adoption of ML in emerging applications is privacy,
namely information leakage from the ML models. ML clas-
sifiers have been used for different wireless tasks such as
spectrum sensing [23], RF signal classification [24], signal
authentication [25], and anti-jamming [26]. However, the un-
derlying privacy vulnerabilities have not been well understood
yet. One particular attack shown in Fig. 1 is the membership
inference attack (MIA) [27]–[33] that aims to infer if a
particular data sample has been used during training or not.
While the MIA has been studied for computer vision
and other data domains, it has not been applied yet to
wireless domain. However, broadcast and shared nature of
wireless medium enables adversaries to eavesdrop wireless
transmissions and provide unique opportunities for the MIA
to infer device and environment characteristics over the air.
For example, the adversary can sense the spectrum to observe
the behavior of a wireless signal classifier and then launch the
MIA to reveal whether it has been trained against a particular
waveform, radio device, or channel environment. Therefore, it
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is critical to understand the privacy vulnerabilities due to the
MIA, when launched against wireless applications of ML.
We consider a DL-based wireless signal classifier as the ML
algorithm against which the MIA is launched (see Fig. 2). Such
a classifier can be used by a service provider (e.g., gNodeB
in 5G applications) to support communication requests for au-
thorized users (e.g., IoT devices) by using the RF fingerprint,
namely the inherent characteristics of the user’s RF transceiver
along with channel effects. In particular, a deep neural network
(DNN) is used at the service provider to classify users of
received signals as authorized or not based on RF fingerprints.
Then, the service provider accepts communication requests
only from authorized users. The adversary launches the MIA
to determine whether a data sample (a wireless signal) is
in training data or not, and thus attempts to obtain private
information about the training data used for the ML model. For
the application of RF fingerprinting for user authentication, the
MIA can leak private information from intended users (such
as device and spectrum environment used during training), and
thus the adversary can effectively launch other attacks, e.g.,
generate data similar to authorized users using the same device
and spectrum environment characteristics to obtain network
access.
Different from other data domains such as computer vision,
the wireless systems admit unique challenges to be considered
in the MIA design. In particular, an eavesdropper observes a
transmitted signal with channel characteristics different from
(but potentially correlated with) the intended receiver, and
therefore the data collected by the adversary is inherently
different than the one at the intended receiver. Moreover, the
MIA is also performed on the signal received at the adversary.
That is, the adversary aims to determine for its received
signal, whether the corresponding signal received at the service
provider is used in training data, or not. Note that those two
signals are not the same due to different channels experienced
by the adversary and the receiver.
We set up a test scenario of one service provider such
as a gNodeB in 5G and three authorized users such as user
equipments (UEs) in terms of IoT devices. The signals of these
users are modulated with QPSK (class 1 data) while the signals
of other users are modulated with BPSK (class 0 data). Signals
of each user are embedded with different channel and device-
specific phase shift and transmit power effects. A DL classifier
is used to classify the received signals and the classification
accuracy is close to 100% under various settings. On the other
hand, an adversary collects data to build a surrogate model to
classify signals received at the adversary as class 1 or 0.
By using this surrogate classifier, the adversary launches the
MIA to infer whether for a signal received at the adversary,
its corresponding signal received at the service provider is in
the training data or not. Note that not all QPSK signals are
in the training data and the training data includes only QPSK
signals with certain device and channel characteristics (power
and phase shifts). Unauthorized users also send QPSK signals
that would confuse the adversary. The signal-to-noise-ratio
(SNR) of authorized user signals is set as 10 dB or 3 dB. When
signals are strong (at 10 dB), the accuracy of the MIA reaches
88.62%. When either power or phase shift varies in signals of
different users, we find that using phase shift only (keeping
power the same), the accuracy of the MIA is 62.83%, while
using power only (keeping phase shift the same) the accuracy
of the MIA is 71.71%. This result suggests that power plays a
more important role in the MIA. However, the MIA works best
when signals of different users are separated by both power
and phase shift. We further study the case that authorized users
have weaker SNR (at 3 dB) and find that the accuracy of the
MIA is 77.01%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. Section III describes the classifier
at the service provider and the surrogate classifier at the
adversary. Section IV presents the algorithm for the MIA.
Section V presents the MIA results under various settings.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless system that provides different ser-
vices on the same physical network as shown in Fig. 2. Ex-
ample use cases include, but not limited to, network slicing in
5G and IoT networks. A classifier is built to detect authorized
users of these services. An adversary aims to launch a MIA
such that it can determine which users’ signals are used in
training data. The adversary can then generate similar signals
to gain the service.
Service
provider
Authorized
user
Other
user
Adversary
Fig. 2. The MIA scenario with a service provider, an adversary, and sets of
authorized users and other users.
To authorize users for a particular service, the service
provider uses a DL classifier, i.e., a DNN has been trained
to classify users as authenticated or not. During training, each
authorized user transmits some signals that are received subject
to channel and noise effects and labeled as class 1 data, and
other signals are labeled as class 0. The training data includes
signals with different modulations, device-specific phase shifts
as well as channel-specific gains and phase shift offsets in
received signals. As we will later show in Section V, such
a classifier can achieve high accuracy such that the service
provider can reliably detect authorized users.
If a user is not classified as an authorized user, the service
provider does not grant it any access. If a user is classified as
an authorized user with higher probability than another user,
the service provider can give that authorized user longer com-
munication time than the other user, where the communication
time is measured by the fraction of service time.
In our over-the-air attack model, an adversary can collect
signals transmitted from users and observe (overhear) their
start of communications with the service provider (as an
indicator of service) due to the shared and broadcast nature of
wireless medium. An adversary can identify service received
by each user by checking if there are follow-up signals with
the same characteristics as in the authorization stage. Thus,
an adversary can determine the class for each collected signal.
Then, the adversary builds a surrogate classifier based on such
data. This corresponds to an inference (exploratory) attack
[34]–[37] that can be used to launch subsequent attacks [38].
In the attack model considered in this paper, the adversary
further analyzes this surrogate classifier and launches the MIA
to determine whether a received signal is in the training data or
not. Once the MIA is successful and signal characteristics of
interest (e.g., device and channel) are identified, the adversary
may perform other attacks, e.g., it may generate signals similar
to those used in training data to gain service.
III. THE CLASSIFIER AT THE SERVICE PROVIDER AND THE
SURROGATE CLASSIFIER AT THE ADVERSARY
We consider a service provider that aims to provide com-
munications for some authorized users using the QPSK mod-
ulation for its signals. A simple classifier for modulation
recognition does not achieve this objective since it can only
tell whether a signal is using QPSK or not, but cannot tell
whether the source of a received signal is one of the authorized
users. To detect authorized users, we need to consider user-
specific properties. In particular, each user as a transmitter has
its own phase shift due to its unique radio hardware. Moreover,
the channel from a user to the service provider has its own
channel gain and phase shift. As a consequence, the phase shift
and power of received signals are unique properties for users.
Denote φi and φis as the phase shift of user i and the phase
shift of channel from i to service provider s, respectively, and
gis as channel gain from i to s. For example, if the raw data
is two bits 00 and transmit power is p, the received phase shift
should be pi4 +φi+φis and the received power should be gisp.
In reality, the collected data may have small random errors,
i.e., nφ for noise on phase shift and np for noise on power.
A service provider collects phase shift and power of received
signals as user-specific properties and uses them as features to
build a classifier to detect authorized users.
We denote QPSK signals from authorized users by Class 1
and BPSK signals from other users by Class 0. The service
provider again collects the phase shift and the power as
features. For example, if the raw data is a bit 0, the received
phase shift from transmitter j is φj+φjs+nφ and the received
power should be gjsp + np. To have the same number of
features, we assume that the signal length for each bit is the
same under different modulations. For the case that data is
sampled once for each bit, the number of collected features is
2n for n bits, including n phase shifts and n power levels.
During the training period, the service provider collects
samples (each with 2n features and a label). Then, it trains a
feedforward neural network as classifier C with the following
properties:
• The input layer takes 32 features per sample.
• There are three hidden layers, each with 100 neurons.
• ReLU is used as the activation function at hidden layers.
• The output layer provides binary labels.
• Softmax is used as activation function at the output layer.
• The DNN is trained by the backpropagation algorithm
with Adam optimizer using cross-entropy as the loss
function.
The process of building classifier C is shown in the top
portion of Fig. 3. In our attack model, the classifier C is
unknown to the adversary. Before the adversary can launch
the MIA, it must obtain some knowledge on classifier C. One
approach is to build a surrogate classifier for C, where the
adversary collects features over the air for each sample and
observes whether the corresponding user is granted service
from the provider (e.g., communications) to learn the label of
each sample. With these collected data samples, the adversary
can build a surrogate classifier Cˆ as a DNN. We assume that Cˆ
also has three hidden layers, each with 100 neurons. Note that
classifiers Cˆ and C are not equal since for the same transmitted
signal, the received signals at the service provider and at the
adversary are different, i.e., the inputs to Cˆ and C are different.
Instead, these two classifiers should provide the same label for
their inputs on the same transmitted signal. The accuracy of
classifier Cˆ is close to 100%. The process of building classifier
Cˆ is shown in the middle portion of Fig. 3. Next, we will
discuss how to launch the MIA using this surrogate model.
IV. MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACK
The goal of the MIA is to identify data samples that have
been used to train a ML classifier [27]–[33]. One possible
application of the MIA in PHY-layer signal authentication
is that the adversary can identify the signal samples that
have been used in the training of a wireless signal classifier.
Then, the adversary can leverage these signal samples and
the leaked information on waveform, device and channel
characteristics of authorized users to generate signals in order
to obtain service from the provider. The training data and the
general data usually have different distributions (e.g., due to
differences of radios and channels in training and test times)
and the classifier may overfit the training data. The MIA
analyzes the overfitting to leak private information.
We first give a simple example for the MIA. Suppose the
general distribution (of signal samples) is θ∗ and the training
data distribution is θˆ. For a given data sample x′, we can
determine the probability of x′ generated by θ∗ (or by θˆ). If
Pθˆ(x
′) > Pθ∗(x′), then x′ is likely to be generated by θˆ (where
Pθ(x) denotes the probability of distribution θ evaluated at x.
Moreover, we can calculate a confidence value for the MIA by
Pθˆ(x
′)
Pθˆ(x
′)+Pθ∗ (x′)
. This analysis provides a prediction on whether
any given data sample is in the training data or not, along with
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Fig. 3. The MIA procedure (given the target classifier C has been trained
(top figure), the adversary observes the spectrum to build a surrogate classifier
Cˆ (middle figure) and uses Cˆ to optimize an inference model (bottom figure)
that determines if a data sample is in training data of C or not).
a confidence value for this prediction. Note that if θ∗ = θˆ, the
confidence value is always 0.5, i.e., we cannot make any better
prediction than a blind guess. Thus, the basis of the MIA is
the difference between θ∗ and θˆ. Next, we provide the details
of the MIA.
Suppose that each sample in the training data set is repre-
sented by a set of features F and is labeled as one of two
classes. The MIA aims to identify whether a given sample
is in the training data set to build the given classifier or not.
This attack may be a white-box attack, i.e., the target classifier
is available to the adversary, or a black-box attack, where
the adversary builds a surrogate classifier that is functionally
equivalent and substitutes for the target classifier for MIA
attack. To launch an effective MIA, we consider a general
approach as follows. Suppose that features include all (useful,
but potentially biased and noisy) information, where useful
information in Fu can be used to identify the class, biased
information Fb is due to the different distributions of training
data and general test data, and noisy information Fn is
other information with no statistical significance. Note that
to simplify discussion, we assume each feature includes only
one type of information. For the general case that one feature
includes multiple types of information, we can divide it into
multiple features to meet our assumption. DL is relied upon
to extract useful and biased information while ignoring noisy
information. Then, a classifier is optimized to fit on useful
and biased information (Fu and Fb). While fitting on Fu can
provide correct classification on general test data, fitting on
Fb is called overfitting, which provides correct classification
on the given training data but wrong classification on general
test data.
For both white-box and black-box MIAs, overfitting is
the key factor leading to privacy issues as the classifier (or
the surrogate classifier) memorizes some characteristics of
the training data in Fb and reflects it in the model’s output
behavior. Thus, we can infer the training data membership
based on overfitting. In particular, if overfitting exists in
training data, some features not related with a class may be
used for classification. Therefore, a sample with such a feature
is likely in the training data. By identifying such features in Fb,
we can predict the membership and also provide a confidence
score on such predictions. However, the distribution of training
data may not be available and the distribution of general test
data is unknown. Thus, features related with overfitting cannot
be obtained directly for membership inference.
Since DL models are sensitive to training data, the adversary
can investigate parameters in the target (or surrogate) classifier
based on local linear approximation for each layer and the
combination of all layers, as studied in [28]. This approach
builds a classifier for membership inference. Unlike the naive
attack, where only an inference result is obtained, the surrogate
classifier can also provide a confidence score on the inferred
results.
We follow the MIA model from [28]. After building the
surrogate classifier, the adversary can determine a class Yˆ for
any given data sample X . The MIA requires the adversary
to further build an inference model m(X, Yˆ ) to provide a
probability of being in training data for any sample X and its
label Yˆ (obtained by the surrogate model). Let PD(X, Yˆ ) and
PD¯(X, Yˆ ) denote the conditional probabilities of (X, Yˆ ) for
samples in training data D or not, respectively. Then, the gain
function for MIA [28] is given by
G(m) =
1
2
E(X,Yˆ )∼PD(X,Yˆ )[logm(X, Yˆ )] (1)
+
1
2
E(X,Yˆ )∼PD¯(X,Yˆ )[log(1−m(X, Yˆ ))] ,
where E[·] is the expectation function. We use weight 12
because we want to maximize the gain on both samples that
are in training data and not in training data. In reality, we do
not have PD(X, Yˆ ) and PD¯(X, Yˆ ), and thus cannot calculate
the gain defined in (1). Thus, we consider an empirical gain
on a data set DA, which is a representative subset of D, and
a data set D¯A, which is a representative subset of D¯. The
empirical gain is defined in [28] as
GDA,D¯A(m) =
1
2|DA|E(X,Yˆ )∈DA [logm(X, Yˆ )] (2)
+
1
2|D¯A|E(X,Yˆ )∈D¯A [log(1−m(X, Yˆ ))].
To find the optimal inference model m(X, Yˆ ), we need to
solve
max
m
GDA,D¯A(m). (3)
We can again see the need of different distributions of training
data and general data from (3). If there is no difference,
two representative subsets can be the same, i.e., DA = D¯A.
For such sets, the optimal solution to the above problem is
m(X, Yˆ ) = 0.5 for all samples, i.e., the MIA is not successful
if there is no difference on distributions.
The process of launching the MIA is shown in the bottom
portion of Fig. 3. There are two steps for predicting whether a
given signal sample X is in the training data of target classifier
C or not:
1. The adversary predicts the label of X as Yˆ by using its
surrogate classifier Cˆ.
2. The adversary computes m(X, Yˆ ) as the probability that
X is in training data of target classifier C.
Note that in the wireless signal classification problem con-
sidered in this paper, each sample X consists of 32 features,
namely each sample has phase shift and power values for 16
bits.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For performance evaluation, we consider the case of one
service provider, three authorized users, and some other users.
Authorized users transmit only QPSK signals to the service
provider while other users transmit either BPSK or QPSK
signals. The service provider aims to distinguish signals from
authorized and other users by using its classifier C that is not a
simple modulation classifier since both authorized and unau-
thorized users may transmit QPSK signals. By overhearing
signals and identifying who gains access, the adversary builds
a surrogate classifier Cˆ to distinguish signals from authorized
users and other users, and further launches the MIA.
The training data of C has 8000 signal samples. Half of
them are class 1 samples, which correspond to QPSK signals
from authorized users. The remaining class 0 samples are
BPSK signals from other users. Each sample has phase shift
and power values for 16 bits, i.e., there are 32 features. These
values are collected with noise within small bounds [−eu, eu],
where eu for phase values is 0.1 and for power values is the
same as noise. The training of Cˆ is based on 1000 samples,
half for class 1 data and half for class 0 data. Note that the
TABLE I
CONFUSION MATRIX WHEN AUTHORIZED USERS HAVE STRONGER
SIGNALS (ALL USERS HAVE DIFFERENT POWERS AND PHASE SHIFTS).
Real \ Predicted non-member member
non-member 0.9152 0.0848
member 0.1429 0.8571
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX WHEN AUTHORIZED USERS HAVE STRONGER
SIGNALS (AUTHORIZED USERS AND OTHER USERS HAVE THE SAME
POWER BUT DIFFERENT PHASE SHIFTS).
Real \ Predicted non-member member
non-member 0.4766 0.5234
member 0.2199 0.7801
training data set of Cˆ is smaller than that of C, as the adversary
may not have access or time to collect as many training data
samples as in C that was trained before the attack. In test
time, we use 10000 samples for both C or Cˆ. The surrogate
classifier Cˆ achieves almost 100% accuracy.
To evaluate the MIA performance, 1000 samples from 8000
training samples are used as member samples. Note that we
do not use the received signals at the service provider since
the adversary does not have access to the received signals at
the adversary. Instead, we use corresponding signals received
at the adversary. In addition, 1000 samples are used as non-
member samples (samples not from training data) in test time.
Among these samples, half are QPSK signals from authorized
users (class 1 data) and half are QPSK from other users (class 0
data). The SNR values are about 10 dB and 3 dB, respectively,
to represent strong and weak signal cases. We first consider
the case of stronger SNR (10 dB). The accuracy of the MIA
(i.e., the average accuracy of predicting member and non-
member samples) is 88.62% and the confusion matrix is given
in Table I.
This MIA attack uses 32 features on both phase shift
and power. To evaluate the impact of phase shift and power
separately, we perform two additional studies using either
the same phase shift or same power for QPSK signals from
authorized users or from other users. If we keep the same
power, the accuracy of the MIA is reduced to 62.83% and
the confusion matrix is shown in Table II. If we keep the
same phase shift, the accuracy of the MIA is 71.71% and
the confusion matrix is shown in Table III. Based on these
results, it is observed that power plays a more important role
in the MIA than phase shift, and the MIA benefits more from
differences in terms of both power and phase shift.
Another scenario that we consider is the case of weaker
SNR, i.e., 3 dB for authorized users while other users still
have 10 dB signals. The accuracy of the MIA is measured as
77.01% and the confusion matrix is given in Table IV. These
results show that as the authorized user signals become weaker,
the success of the MIA drops but remains much higher than
blind guess.
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX WHEN AUTHORIZED USERS HAVE STRONGER
SIGNALS (AUTHORIZED USERS AND OTHER USERS HAVE THE SAME PHASE
SHIFT BUT DIFFERENT POWERS).
Real \ Predicted non-member member
non-member 0.5770 0.4230
member 0.1429 0.8571
TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX WHEN AUTHORIZED USERS HAVE WEAKER SIGNALS
(ALL USERS HAVE DIFFERENT POWERS AND PHASE SHIFTS).
Real \ Predicted non-member member
non-member 0.9129 0.0871
member 0.3728 0.6272
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the member inference as a novel
privacy threat against ML-based wireless applications. An
adversary launches the MIA to infer whether signals of interest
have been used to train a wireless signal classifier or not. An
example use case for this attack is user authentication in 5G
or IoT systems. In this attack, as the adversary cannot collect
the same signals as those received at the service provider, it
first builds a surrogate model, namely a functionally equivalent
classifier as the target classifier of the service provider. The
input of this model consists of the received power and the
phase shift. We showed that under various settings, a surrogate
classifier can be built reliably. Then, the adversary launches the
MIA to identify whether for a received signal, its correspond-
ing signal received at the service provider is in the training
data or not. When authorized users have stronger SNRs, the
adversary is more successful in the MIA. We showed that the
accuracy of the MIA reaches 88.62%. When the impact of
power and phase shift is studied separately keeping one the
same in both member and non-member samples, we observed
that power plays a more important role in the MIA. For
the case where the authorized users have weaker SNR, the
adversary loses its advantage and performance of the MIA
accuracy drops to 77.01% but it is still much higher than blind
guess. These results indicate the MIA as a genuine threat for
wireless privacy and show how the MIA can be effectively
launched to infer private information from ML-based wireless
systems over the air.
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